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Abstract
This study examines income inequity in access to health care in the United States.  Given
the predominant and growing presence of managed care organizations as a source of medical
insurance and care in both the private and public settings, replacing traditional indemnity plans
as a lower cost prophylactic alternative, we speculate that the presence of Managed Care
Organizations would reduce, if not eliminate, any pro wealthy bias in access to health care for
the insured population in the U.S. We rely on previously developed methodology from the
WVEcuityII project, incorporating the health inequity index (HI ), to estimate income inequity in
traditional indemnity and managed care plans. Our results are surprisingly counterintuitive to the
WVexpected result that managed care was designed to have on access to care.  The calculated HI
indicates a relatively greater pro wealthy bias in the managed care group. This result has
important and direct policy implications as public insurance programs in the U.S. contract with
managed care organizations as a lower cost alternative for Medicaid and Medicare beneficiaries.
JEL Classification Codes: J32, J33




The United States has for some time been a conspicuous exception to the general rule of 
universal health insurance coverage among advanced industrial countries.  Though public 
programs (most notably, Medicare and Medicaid) exist to provide insurance for some of the 
members of the population unable to afford private insurance, the last three decades have 
been characterized by substantial increases in the number of uninsured in the U.S.  In 1977, 
8.7% of the population had no form of insurance; and by 1987, the proportion of uninsured 
had increased to 10.3% and to 12.2% in 1996; moreover, at any given point during a year, 
the proportion of uninsured is likely to be higher [1].  Notwithstanding the availability of 
public insurance programs, there continues to be concern about equality of access to care.  
In particular, the roughly fifteen percent of the population without any health insurance 
would appear to be at a particular disadvantage in obtaining health care. 
 
Less obviously, the type of insurance coverage may also play a role in access to health care.  
Managed Care Organization (MCO) insurance programs have become increasingly 
important in the U.S. over time, with a corresponding reduction in the proportion of the 
population covered by the more traditional combination of indemnity insurance with fee-
for-service (FFS) medical care.  Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) enrollment 
increased from 3% to 13.3% of the insured population from 1977 to 1987, and to 42% in 
1996 [2].  If managed care influences access to care differently from traditional care, the 
consequences are thus potentially quite substantial. 
 
4 
We consider two types of access effects that managed care might have.  The first, which 
has drawn far more attention in the literature and which we deal with only in passing in this 
paper, is that managed care would be expected to provide less care per capita as measured 
by health care resource utilization.  One would expect this result because of the different 
economic incentives placed on care providers based on the business model employed.  
Even advocates of managed care expect to see reductions in medical resource use as a part 
of eliminating unnecessary care and providing necessary care more efficiently.  A great 
deal of research has been conducted on resource use in managed care, both at the individual 
medical condition level, as well as overall. 
 
Horizontal equity (i.e. equal care for equal need) has been compared among select EU 
countries and the United States.  The European Union’s Biomed Programme funded the 
ECuity project, whose members worked on a multi-year multi-country project entitled 
“Equity in the Finance and Delivery of Health Care in Europe.”  The participants examined 
horizontal inequities in the delivery of health care in their own countries.  The United States 
results showed that, for a given need, that although the wealthy do not necessarily get more 
care in terms of volume (i.e. physician visits, specialist visits, and inpatient care days), 
there is evidence of a pro-wealthy bias when actual expenditures for these services are 
considered [3]. 
 
 More recently, U.S. results show that there is an unadjusted pro-poor bias in medical care 
utilization, and that as need, region, and the existence of private insurance are accounted 
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for, the bias switches and becomes pro-rich  [4].  However, relatively little attention has 
been given to the issue of the role of the type of insurance plan (FFS or MCO) in affecting 
equity of access across income levels.  This is the main concern of this paper.  We use the 
methodology developed in the EcuityII project to investigate the degree of horizontal 
inequity in managed care and traditional insurance plans in the United States.  In addition to 
allowing for direct analysis of the effect that type of insurance has on equity in access to 
health care in the U.S., this approach has the advantage of allowing good comparisons 
between the U.S. and other industrialized countries for the total (insured and uninsured) 
populations.  At the center of the EcuityII project has been the insistence on the use of data 
sets that are as similar as possible and similar statistical analyses for all countries; thus,  
there are a number of international comparisons that can be made without speculating on 
the effects of differing data sets and econometric approaches.  
 
The first section is a brief overview of the definition and estimation techniques for 
horizontal inequity in the delivery of health care.  Since this is a topic that has been well 
covered in other papers arising from the ECuity II project, this will be a summary rather 
than the full explanation that can be found in cited sources.  The second section discusses 
relevant changes and trends in the health care system in the United States, with a particular 
focus on the different incentives characteristic of FFS and MCO designed insurance plans.  
We then discuss our data set, the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and our 





Health Inequality Measures and Estimation Techniques  
The health inequality measures and estimation techniques in this study closely follow 
previous work on horizontal inequity in EU and OECD countries [3, 4].  Specifically, the 
health inequality index, HIWV [5], and the indirect standardization method are applied to the 
MEPS data set, with some additional grouping of data in order to compare equity within 
insurance categories. 
 
Unstandardized income quintile distributions report the average use of the particular type of 
medical care by the individuals in the given quintile.  The standardized quintile 
distributions adjust the actual values by first estimating the expected use by quintile, and 
then adding the difference between the observed and expected use to overall mean use.  The 
expected use is estimated as predicted values from a regression of health care use on health 
status, age, and gender variables. 
 
Standardization of need allows a comparison of the distribution of medical care across 
income with a distribution that is adjusted for need.  Health status (self-reported as well as a 
measure of disability), age, and gender variables are used to standardize for need for 
medical care.  We identify three measures of medical care in our estimations:  physician 
visits, hospital nights, and total medical expenditures.  Standardization is performed for the 
entire insured population, then separately for the FFS and MCO populations.  This method 
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of standardizing for need assumes that the health care system, overall, meets medical need, 
in that on average, the health care system provides just the right amount of care for an 
individual with a given set of characteristics to be standardized on.  We can estimate what 
that level of care is, and then examine the data to see if there are systematic income-related 
variations in the difference between the amount of medical care actually provided, and what 
needs to be provided. 
A concentration curve approach is used to estimate the index for horizontal inequity in the 
delivery of health care.  The health equity index, HIWV, is a measure derived from first, 
obtaining a concentration index that reports the degree of inequality in the distribution of 
medical care (unadjusted for need), and second, a concentration index of need, which uses a 
two-part model to predict utilization of medical care, given need.  The cumulative percent 
of the population, ranked by income, is measured against the cumulative percent of medical 
care utilization (actual and predicted).  The difference in the concentration indices directly 
calculates the health equity index.  For instance, if the need-adjusted concentration curve 
lies above the concentration curve that has not been adjusted for need, then there is a pro-
rich bias in the delivery of medical care, and the calculated index has a value greater than 
zero.  Alternatively, if the need-adjusted curve lies below the unadjusted curve, then the 
interpretation is a pro-poor bias, and HIWV is less than zero.  If the index is zero, it cannot 
be assumed that no bias exists, as a pro-rich bias observed in one curve may cancel the pro-
poor bias in the other if the curves cross such that the area under each (relative to the 
diagonal) is the same [5]. 
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The prediction of health care utilization, as adjusted for need, is achieved using a two-part 
estimation method.  The logistic regression in the two-part model estimates the probability 
of any utilization of health care.  Part two of the specification uses a truncated negative 
binomial count model to return the expected value of the utilization of health care, given 
positive utilization estimates as returned in the logit specification [4].  We rely on the two-
part model of demand for medical care for our subpopulations (MCO and FFS) as a better 
predictor of actual outcomes than a sample selection model because of the smaller MFSE 
(mean square forecasting error) associated with the two-part model [6, 7].  Furthermore, as 
we are not as concerned with parameter estimates, per se, as with predicted utilization, any 
selection bias not addressed by standardization for a particular subpopulation is likewise 
observed in the estimation for the alternative subpopulation, and thus, still allows for an 
opportunity for comparison between the plans. 
 
A significant design note is the consideration of survey design effects.  Models that rely on 
standard regression techniques will typically understate the standard errors of the estimates.  
This could result in attribution of an explanatory effect where none exists.  The survey-
specific models take into account the design effect of the survey and are therefore a truer 
estimate of the independent effect.  To obtain estimates of variability (such as the standard 
error of sample estimates or corresponding confidence intervals) for estimates based on the 
survey data, one needs to take into account the complex sample design for both person and 
family level analyses.  The data set includes the appropriate strata and psu (primary 
sampling unit) identifier variables, as well as a sampling weight (the inverse of the 
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probability that the observation is included in the design) to correct for the loss of precision 
in variance estimation associated with the sample design (i.e. observations are not 
independent and identically distributed in a complex survey).  Simply applying the 
independently and identically distributed methodology for analysis would lead to biased 
point estimators and variance estimates that would likely understate the level of uncertainty 
associated with the estimates [8].  The results will be substantially more reliable than 
results obtained without considering design effects.   
 
Health Care and Insurance in the U.S. 
Over the last 30 years, there have been considerable changes in the structure of the medical 
care industry in the United States.  The changes are primarily associated with the 
administration and financing of medical care towards a goal of increasing efficiency and 
reducing costs.  The result has been the introduction and prevalence of MCOs that have 
made major inroads on the more traditional form of health care insurance.  Of the insured 
population in the U.S. (those less than sixty-five years old, as virtually all persons sixty-five 
and over have Medicare), a significant number are now enrolled in some type of managed 
care plan.  In 1996, nearly 42% of the insured population was enrolled in a Health 
Maintenance Organization (HMO), and nearly 36.5% of those publicly insured were 
covered by managed care.  This is more than triple the rate, 13.3%, of the total population 
HMO enrollment in 1987 [2]. 
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Given the complex nature of managed care, it is important to note that the term “HMO” is not 
often used in terms of its strict definition(s).  To the typical user or provider of health care, 
“HMO” has come to mean any plan under which the enrollee has a limited choice in provider 
selection, and thus is often used to indicate any type of managed care plan.  That is, it has 
become the term that describes every type of plan that is not fee-for service.  Because of this 
common technical misunderstanding, the term HMO in our estimates includes anyone 
covered by a managed care plan. 
The 1996 MEPS survey determined HMO vs. other MCO enrollment based on a series of 
questions about plan characteristics.  The determination of the respondent’s status as an 
HMO enrollee (public or private) was based on three types of questions: 1) Do you belong to 
an HMO?, 2) Are you covered by your HMO if you see a physician who is not an HMO 
doctor without a referral?, and 3) Must your primary care doctor be chosen from a list 
provided by your insurer?  Yes to any of these would indicate HMO enrollment.  Because 
cognitive studies conducted prior to the survey indicated people’s inability to distinguish 
between plans within managed care, it makes sense to combine the MCO and HMO status 
variables.  In 1996, HMO enrollees were primarily covered by private insurance, tended to be 
young adults and children (47.6% of the privately insured non-elderly population belonged to 
an HMO), and were slightly skewed toward the upper income thresholds (45.6% high income 
and 37% low income of the insured were enrolled in an HMO).  Differences in health status 
for HMO participants were concentrated among the publicly insured.  Those who reported 
needing assistance to perform daily activities, or who were unable to work because of a 
chronic condition were more likely to be enrolled in an HMO [9]. 
11 
Of the total population (insured and uninsured) in 1996, the reported rates for MCO and 
HMO were as follows: 1.7% in a Medicare HMO, 4.8% in a Medicaid HMO, 26.9% in a 
private HMO, 4.5% in a private MCO, and .08% in a Medicaid MCO.  In total, 33.46% 
belonged to an HMO, and 5.4% reported membership in an MCO.  In 1987, the data reflect 
HMO membership based on the respondent’s identification of his health plan from a list of 
local HMOs in each of four rounds.  Estimates of HMO enrollment in 1987 use a constructed 
variable that reflects full-year enrollment and group policyholders’ selections of HMO 
coverage for their members [2].  Taken separately, the 1987 data indicate round-specific 
enrollment rates ranging from 8.3 – 10.4% of the total population. 
 
HMO enrollment increased from 3% to 13.3% of the insured population from 1977 to 1987.  
This is not a surprising result as HMOs were not a dominant business plan in 1977.  In 1987, 
76% of people in HMOs had the option of choosing a FFS program from menu of benefits 
and 31% of those enrolled in FFS had an HMO as an option.  The result is that although the 
members of HMOs are likely to be younger, they are not necessarily healthier.  This finding 
is attributed to the possibility that younger people with young families choose the HMO 
option because it has lower out-of-pocket costs and that there is not an established long-term 
relationship with a physician.  Persons with chronic conditions such as diabetes and cancer 
were more likely to be enrolled in a FFS program (probably due to a relationship with the 
treating physician and the emotional costs of switching providers).  The near poor (those with 
incomes of 100-124% of the poverty level income) were more likely to be enrolled in a FFS  
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- perhaps the influence of Medicaid enrollees or more limited options offered by employers in 
“blue collar” jobs [2]. 
 
The transformation of the medical services industry from one dominated by traditional 
indemnity business plans, to a market-driven industry based on the costs of providing 
service has contributed to a variety of downstream changes that affect access to medical 
care [1].  Some of these effects include: 
• the redistribution of the insured population from indemnity plans to managed care 
(MCO) 
•  a reduction in hospital-based services 
•  a net decrease in the number of hospitals and long-term and special care facilities 
•  the elimination of many community-based programs that target the medically 
underserved 
• an increase in premiums and co-payments for the insured 
• policy initiatives at the state and federal levels that address quality and availability of 
health care services and health insurance. 
 
The primary focus of MCOs is to control costs through patient utilization programs and 
financial incentives (disincentives) to providers.  The most restrictive utilization programs 
imposed on the provider would require that a physician obtain approval prior to using an 
expensive test or treatment for a particular patient, or use only lower cost, MCO approved 
facilities for patient care, despite medical need as determined by the physician.  Another type 
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of financial disincentive for the physician is the utilization review.  Upon review of diagnosis 
and subsequent treatment, if the doctor fails to justify treatment and procedures performed 
within the guidelines established by the insurer, reimbursement will be denied.  MCOs also 
use “guidelines” and “care paths” as vehicles to control costs.  Rather than mandating 
particular courses of treatment, social workers employed by the MCO (or the physician 
provider group practice) will consult the doctor as to the insurance company’s recommended 
course of treatment for a particular disease.  A third and prominent feature of HMOs is a 
utilization management technique that makes the PCP the “gate keeper” for referrals to more 
costly specialists.  In addition, the MCO physician is increasingly responsible for 
coordinating all levels of individual patient care, e.g. contacting nursing homes or 
rehabilitation facilities to admit a patient for care.  This has created additional time burdens 
for the physicians [10]. 
The predominance of MCOs has an effect on the amount of care provided because of the 
incentive-based nature of the relationship with the providers, i.e., financial incentives placed 
on providers serve as tools to manage resource utilization indirectly.  These arrangements 
carry varying degrees of financial risk (and reward) for the provider and the insurer.  The 
restrictions on provider care and the financial risks faced by the physician/provider would 
predict lower utilization of medical care in MCOs except for the patient or physician who 
aggressively seeks particular medical treatment. 
Providers who contract with an MCO typically receive a preset dollar amount for each 
enrollee, regardless of the actual costs of providing the medical services.  A provider’s 
incentive to maintain a profit may be a disincentive to more costly treatment such as 
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making a patient referral for specialized care or hospital admission, except in acute cases 
[11]. 
 
Discounting may also affect the quality and amount of care provided to patients.  As 
providers agree to accept discounted payments for services provided, they are likely to 
minimize costs and potentially put quality at risk.  This is not a trivial issue in the health 
care industry.  An individual’s health may be compromised because of the incentives 
conceived by MCOs (in addition to tort reform in the mid-1980s that limited a plaintiff’s 
compensation for malpractice and legislative protection of HMOs against malpractice 
claims).  Under indemnity insurance plans, providers were more likely to make referrals, 
order expensive tests, and provide “more” care if a medical issue presented or was 
suspected in a patient (in part to avoid malpractice claims for missed or incorrect 
diagnoses).  A “treat ‘em and street ‘em” approach is more common under Managed Care 
Plans than under indemnity plans.  The disincentive to treat, except in the most obvious and 
acute cases, is balanced against: first, the probability of a severe result due to misdiagnosis 
and the consequent (possibly more severe or untreatable) health issues, and second, the 
probability of a formal complaint to the state licensing board or a malpractice action [1]. 
These developments in the evolution of health care plans in the U.S. indicate that as the 
insurers and employers look to pass along more of the cost to the enrollees, the effect might 
be to deliver advantages in health care to the wealthy that would be financially unattainable 
for others [12].  The expenditure inequity is likely to be magnified as many health insurers 
now offer “tiered” plans that charge a significant co-pay to patients who elect to use a more 
15 
expensive teaching hospital for care  - specialist or inpatient - and a discount to those who 
use community hospitals [13, 14].  Employers are looking for reduced premiums (while 
giving employees more options) and, as a way to control costs, insurers are passing along 
the cost of high-tech treatment to patients.  At least for now, MCOs that offer this 
arrangement will continue to offer more “traditional” coverage, though at a higher 
premium, and offer the tiered plan to employers at a 2-9% discount.  Currently, PacifiCare, 
with presence in eight states, Aetna (New England), Blue Cross/Blue Shield (national 
presence) and Tufts (New England) offer this arrangement.  Community hospitals, which 
have been increasingly forced to close their doors for lack of occupancy, may see a benefit 
as fewer people elect the higher cost academic centers. 
The policy concern is that appropriate medical care may not be available for those who 
cannot afford the surcharge.  There is additional concern that people who live in urban 
areas, where the academic hospitals tend to be concentrated, will be placed out of care as 
they frequently use these centers as their “community” hospitals.  In terms of measuring 
equity vis-à-vis income under a tiered system, it is likely that there would be a pro rich bias 
in expenditures on medical care, but income would have less of an effect on utilization as 
measured by physician visits and nights-in-hospital.  That is, if the wealthier population 
substitutes the academic centers for the lower cost care, then count data such as hospital 
and physician (specialist and PCP) visits will not exhibit inequities in medical care. 
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Data and Estimation 
The data for the US are taken from the Household component of the 1996 round of the 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey [15].  The survey was conducted by the United States 
Agency for Health Research and Quality under the direction of the United States 
Department of Health and Human Services.  It contains data on the financing and use of 
medical care in the United States.  There are four primary components:  household, medical 
provider, insurance, and nursing home.  This study will use only the data from the 
household component.  The respondents for the household component include only the 
civilian, non-institutionalized population.  The data include information on health 
expenditures, use of medical services, and financing of medical expenditures as well as 
standard demographic characteristics.  
The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) household components are stratified 
multistage samples that over-sample populations of policy interest such as the elderly, the 
poor, and minority populations and have 22,600 observations.  The 1996 Household 
Component uses an overlapping panel design in which data are collected through a 
preliminary contact followed by a series of five rounds of interviews over a two and one-
half year period.  Data on medical expenditures and use for two calendar years are collected 
from each household.  The overlapping panel design allows investigators to estimate 
current and continuing expenditures on healthcare and other population characteristics.  The 
sampling frame for the MEPS Household Component is drawn from respondents to the 
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS), conducted by NCHS.  NHIS provides a 
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nationally representative sample of the U.S. civilian noninstitutionalized population, with 
over sampling of Hispanics and blacks.  The year 1996 was the first year of the panel 
survey, and while public use files have been released for a number of subsequent years, 
information classifying the insurance plans into managed care (MCO) vs. traditional (FFS) 
was only provided in the 1996 data set. 
Following the ECuityII protocol, we select variables that include information about health 
care use, income levels, health status, limitations from chronic illness, and other variables 
that might affect use of health care.  The limitations of the primary data source for 
ECuityII, the European Community Household Panel, meant that the number of physician 
visits and the number of hospital nights were the two primary measures of use of medical 
resources.  We follow this by using a count of the number of physician visits including 
office visits, outpatient contacts, and emergency room contacts.  For hospital use, we use 
the number of nights spent in a hospital.  In addition, we use total expenditures on all types 
of medical care as an additional measure of resource use.  Total expenditures have the 
advantage of providing some degree of adjustment for differing levels of quality of the 
services provided, as well as partially compensating for the effect of different general 
approaches to treatment - for example, heavier reliance on drug therapy for some 
subpopulations vs. heavier reliance on hospitalization for others. 
The income variable used is household after tax income per equivalent adult.  Since the 
income data in MEPS are gross income before taxes, it was necessary to estimate income 
tax payments.  The lack of sufficient geographical data made it impossible to estimate 
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either state or local income taxes, but federal taxes were estimated using the National 
Bureau of Economic Research TAXSIM model where possible, which was the great 
majority of the households, and simpler imputation of taxes by income and household size 
for the remainder.  The modified OECD equivalence scale was used to calculate the 
number of equivalent adults in the household.  Included in income were employment and 
self-employment earnings, public and private transfer payments, and earnings from 
property and other investments.  Imputed rent from owner-occupied dwellings and fringe 
benefits paid by employers were not included. 
Health status was measured in two ways.  The first is a self-assessed health status rating for 
overall health of excellent, very good, good, fair, and poor.  The second was reported 
presence of any chronic condition that limited in any way the ability to work at a job, do 
housework, or go to school.  Age and gender were accounted for by a set of eleven age-
gender dummy variables with age breaks of 15, 30, 45, 60, and 70. 
 
Results and discussion 
As discussed earlier in the paper, there are two different types of results.  The first is a set 
of tables showing the actual and standardized distributions of health care by income 
quintile.  The second is a set of health inequality indices for different types of health care.  
Table 1 reports the quintile results and Table 2 the health inequality indices.  In addition, 
Table 3 contains a number of tabulations that are of use in the interpretation of the results in 
Tables 1 and 2.  The entire population was divided into the five quintiles of after-tax 
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household income per equivalent adult, establishing income ranges for each quintile.  These 
quintile ranges are then used to report means for those insured under MCO and FFS plans.  
As a result, the number, for example, of MCO individuals in a given quintile may vary 
somewhat from the expected one-fifth since it is the overall population income distribution 
that is being used rather than the MCO subpopulation distribution.  Thus, when we 
compare individuals in the first quintile of the MCO individuals with individuals in the first 
quintile of the FFS subpopulation, they both fall in the same absolute income range, rather 
than simply being the lowest 20% of their particular subpopulation. 
 
Mean Resource Utilization by Income Quintile 
The first of the two sub tables within Table 1 gives the mean use of the particular type of 
health care resource under both MCO and FFS plans.  The second sub table reports the 
same information after being standardized, as described earlier, for differences in the age, 
gender, and health status of the members of the sample.  Overall means are reported, and to 
give a sense of the degree of inequality, two additional summary measures are included.  
The first is the ratio of the lowest to highest quintiles.  A value greater than one suggests a 
pro-poor distribution.  The second is the difference between the lowest and highest quintile.  
Here a positive value suggests a pro-poor distribution. 
The most striking finding in Table 1 is that with managed care there is a clear pattern of 
both less overall use of medical resources, which is to be expected, but also a clear pattern 
of relatively pro-rich distribution of care by income quintile, when compared with 
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traditional care.  The actual number of MCO physician visits rises slightly as the level of 
income increases, but when adjusted for the generally greater need of the low-income 
population, the pro-rich distribution becomes very pronounced.  Traditional care, on the 
other hand, shows a slightly pro-poor distribution of actual doctor visits, which when 
standardized, shows a pro-rich distribution, although not as strongly as the MCO result. 
With hospital nights, the picture is somewhat different, although managed care remains 
relatively more pro-rich than traditional care.  Once again, MCO enrollees use fewer 
hospital nights per person than traditional care, and the difference is more pronounced than 
with doctors visits.  The actual use is distributed in a pro-poor direction, but when 
standardized for need variables, we observe an MCO distribution that is not obviously pro-
poor or pro-rich, while the FFS distribution appears to be slightly more pro-poor than the 
MCO distribution. 
Turning to total medical care expenditures, we see a pattern that resembles the pattern 
shown by doctors visits.  The actual MCO expenditures are slightly pro-rich, reaching their 
highest level in the top income quintile.  FFS medical care expenditures are highest in the 
lowest income quintiles, showing a generally pro-poor distribution.  After standardization, 
we find a pro-rich distribution in both cases, but more pronounced for MCOs. 
 
Health Inequity Index by Resource Utilization 
In Table 2 we report the health inequality indices for two different insured MCO and FFS 
populations given three types of resource utilization, namely: doctors visits, hospital nights, 
21 
and total medical expenditures.  The first two rows in each sub table report the adjusted index 
for the insured populations under FFS and MCO plans, inclusive of all ages.  We then 
estimate the index for insured sub-samples by age.  Specifically, the user of each resource is 
classified as being either under sixty-five years old, or age sixty-five and older, as virtually all 
people age sixty-five and older in the United States are covered by Medicare.  (Until the mid-
90s, Medicare typically enrolled its members in a FFS plan with participating physicians and 
hospitals providing care.  More recently, the Federal Government has contracted with MCOs 
to enroll Medicare eligible participants). 
Each table by resource utilization includes an index for the entire US population (insured and 
uninsured).  For doctors visits only, we consider the previously reported need-adjusted 
indices for Canada, the UK and Germany [4].  The first index for each population is adjusted 
to reflect medical need [6, 16].  Additional modifications are then considered to account for 
regional, private insurance, and educational effects [4].  
 
For characteristics that are not standardized for, such as race or ethnicity, it would be easier 
for disproportionate concentrations in the higher or lower income quintiles of MCO vs. FFS 
users to create a bias.  However, the proportions of the two substantial minority racial and 
ethnic groups in the US, Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks, do not appear to be greatly 
different in the two types of medical care.  Private and public insurance, on the other hand, 
do show substantially different patterns in distribution across managed and traditional care 
plan users.  This suggests the possible introduction of a bias because of different incentives 
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and provisions of insurance plans.  Upon closer examination, much of the difference is a 
direct result of the differences in the proportion of the 65 and over age group; the higher 
proportion of the elderly in the traditional care plans is almost exactly paralleled by a 
similarly higher proportion of those with some public insurance.  In the lower income 
quintiles, other public insurance programs start to have some importance, and the age effect 
is lessened. 
A potentially more interesting variable is the dummy variable for any private insurance.  
Those in FFS are over twice as likely to lack any private insurance as those in MCOs.  
Previous work has shown the provision of private insurance to have an effect on the degree 
of inequality in the provision of doctors visits in the US [4]; it may be that taking account 
of the degree of private insurance in managed vs. traditional care may shed some light on 
the source of the differences in inequality.  Another variable that shows some pattern of 
variation is the census regions of the traditional and managed care users.  Managed care is 
better established on the two coasts of the country, showing up particularly strongly in the 
West.  Traditional care is more likely in the South and the Midwest of the US. 
After including dummy variables representing regions and private health insurance to the 
list of need-related variables, we see what effect these additional variables have on the HIwv 
index.  These are, of course, not variables that actually represent a plausible need for health 
care; however, if their presence sharply reduces or eliminates the measured inequality, it 
suggests that the added variables are possibly part of the reason for the inequality we see in 
the estimates with the “correct” need variables. 
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Starting with the MCO and FFS indices for the entire population, we find confirmation of 
the pictures shown by the quintile results.  Remembering that positive index values are pro-
rich and negative values are pro-poor, we find that for the three categories of medical care - 
doctors visits, hospital nights, and total expenditures - the MCO index is more positive (pro 
rich) than the FFS index.  In the case of managed care, the index for doctors visits is 
significantly greater than zero, as is the somewhat smaller index for doctors visits under 
traditional care.  FFS has a significantly pro-poor distribution of hospital nights, while 
MCO shows a small and insignificant pro-poor index.  In the case of total health care 
expenditures, neither of the indices is statistically significant, but the positive index for 
managed care is considerably larger than the index for traditional care. 
There are a number of possible explanations for these results.  It may be that there is a 
problem in the standardization and that in spite of standardizing with self assessed health, 
self-reported chronic limitations, age and gender, the lower income quintile users of 
managed care are actually healthier than their health status suggests.  This would mean they 
actually need less medical care than estimated, while at the same time, this bias does not 
exist in the measurement of the upper income quintile users.  This could be the result of a 
compositional effect.  If a particular group, (low-income non-Hispanic blacks, for 
example), were to systematically underestimate health status relative to its true value (there 
is no evidence that this is the case) and if they were heavily represented in the MCO 
subpopulation and not in the FFS subpopulation, it would artificially create an impression 
of a relatively pro-rich bias in the MCO group assuming that the care they received was 
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appropriate to their actual health status (relatively good) rather than their reported health 
status (relatively poor). 
The result of further adjusting the estimates for regional differences and private insurance 
status, for the total population is as follows.  The effect on the provision of doctors visits is 
to make modest reductions in the pro-rich bias for all types of providers, but still leaves 
managed care as clearly more pro-rich than traditional care or the entire US health care 
system, including the uninsured.  With hospital nights, the shift is in the pro-rich direction.  
Managed care hospital night provision now appears to be slightly pro-rich rather than pro-
poor, while traditional care is slightly less pro-poor than it was before.  With respect to total 
medical care expenditures, the addition of the regional and private insurance variables 
essentially eliminates any pro-rich or poor bias from FFS, while only accounting for a 
quarter of the pro-rich bias of the MCO total expenditures. 
To put these findings in context, we can compare them with the inequality indices for the 
entire US household population.  While the MCO and FFS care indices are calculated for a 
subpopulation consisting of those insured under the respective types of plan, the entire 
household population includes not only the insured, but also those without any health 
insurance.  The health inequality indices for the entire population show a pro-rich 
distribution for doctors visits and total spending and a pro-poor distribution for hospital 
nights.  However, all of these indices are more pro-poor than the corresponding indices for 
MCOs.  In other words, although all of the individuals in managed care have insurance, it 
nevertheless appears that there is more of a pro-rich bias in the managed care system than 
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there is in the general population even if we included those without any health insurance.  
This would suggest that even the universal provision of managed health care insurance 
would not necessarily reduce the degree of pro-rich distribution of medical care, but would 
quite possibly make it worse.  This is a counter-intuitive finding.  Since one would assume 
that the lack of health insurance would reduce access and, given the lower the income 
quintile, the more likely one is to not have any health insurance; it would be expected that a 
population with a substantial minority without health insurance would show a more pro-
rich distribution of access to health care.  However, the relative health inequality indices 
show less income inequality in the general population than in the managed care insured 
subpopulation.  
There are no strictly comparable HIwv results for other countries, but some estimates are 
available for the adult population in a number of OECD countries [4].  The HIwv estimates 
for all doctor visits for three of these countries are shown in Table 2 along with the US 
estimate for the overall adult population.  The US HIwv index for adults is somewhat lower 
than the index for the entire non-institutionalized population, but both are quite large in 
comparison with Canada, the UK, and Germany.  In comparison, the HIwv index for those 
with traditional care insurance is closer to, but still more pro-rich than for the three OECD 
countries. 
When we examine the sample means by income quintile in Table 3, it is clear that the 
elderly are a much larger proportion of the traditional care users than of the managed care 
users and correspondingly, there are proportionally more children and working age adults 
26 
among the managed care users.  If children, for example, tended to be systematically 
reported as being in poorer health than they actually are, it would lead to an overestimate of 
children’s health care needs.  This would lead to the conclusion that the MCO plans under 
provide if they supply the smaller amount of care required for the children's actual 
relatively good health state rather than the larger amount of need for care erroneously 
suggested by the relatively poorer reported health status.  However, in principle, this should 
be taken care of by the age-gender standardization.  The exception would be if only the 
children of only the poor have their health status under-reported (or only the children of 
only the rich have their health status over-reported).  This may be possible, but we are not 
aware of any studies that suggest such differential underreporting for any of the age-
gender-income variables.  Another possible explanation would be that the out-of-pocket 
payments associated with MCOs may be particularly burdensome for low-income patients 
and as a result, these patients self-limit the amount of their treatment for financial reasons.  
This does not appear to the case.  Table 3 shows that the out-of-pocket expenditures for 
managed care patients are well below those with traditional care. 
We consider the “natural” age division in the US in the provision of health insurance by 
examining the need-only adjusted health inequity indices for the sub-populations by age.  
As with the total insured results, there continues to be a pro-rich bias in the managed care 
plan for doctor visits in the under sixty-five age group.  For hospital nights, the pro-poor 
bias is carried over and becomes more pronounced for those under age sixty-five in the FFS 
group and those sixty-five or older in the MCO group, while a pro-rich index is observed 
for the under sixty-five MCO population and the over sixty-five FFS group.  There is no 
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obvious bias in hospital nights for the FFS group over age sixty-five.  Examining the index 
for total expenditures by age and type of coverage, we see that the positive index for the 
MCO group becomes more pro-rich for the under sixty-five sub-group, maintains a pro-rich 
bias regardless of age in FFS, and becomes negative for the older MCO population. 
Finally, when estimating the indices for the age subpopulations, we introduce an education 
variable (education is divided into three categories:  less than high school education, high 
school education, and more than high school education) in addition to the three regional 
and private insurance dummy variables.  These variables are included for the total MCO 
and FFS populations to adjust for any advantage that level of education may bring to a user 
of health care.  When we adjust for private insurance, residential location by region, and 
education by age group for doctors visits, more than half of the pro-rich bias that is 
observed in the under sixty-five MCO population for hospital nights is removed, and a 
significant pro-rich bias remains unexplained.  Though not statistically significant, the 
indices for the older populations change sign and the younger FFS population sees the pro-
wealthy index approaching zero, indicating no bias.  For hospital nights, adjusting for 
private insurance, education, and region results in the elimination of a statistically 
significant pro-poor bias in the FFS under sixty-five population (though the estimated index 
maintains only a slightly reduced pro-poor bias).  As with the total population, total 
expenditures are not a statistically significant source of inequity in the provisioning of 
health care as measured by medical expenses for any of the age groups in either type of 
plan.  Although not statistically significant, it is interesting to note the change in the 
magnitude of the inequity within the MCO and FFS sub-groups as additional factors are 
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included in the estimation.  Specifically, some of the pro-rich bias in the under sixty-five 
group is accounted for and the older MCO group has an index that is more pro-poor as 
compared with the index that is estimated when only need is taken into account.  In the FFS 
sub-groups, we see a switch from pro-rich to pro-poor for the under sixty-five population 
and a decrease in the pro-poor bias for the older FFS group. 
 
 
Discussion of Results 
The results suggest that neither the presence of private insurance nor the region of residence 
play a decisive role in understanding the much larger pro-rich bias of the MCOs for either 
the total insured population or the age sub-groups.  This suggests that the privately insured 
patient gets some degree of preferential treatment, and that region may make some 
difference in access to care, but neither effect is particularly effective in explaining the 
difference in inequality between the MCO and FFS plans.  Furthermore, introducing level 
of education has little effect on the results.    
This leaves us with the consideration of more speculative explanations.  It may be that the 
“cream skimming” phenomena play some role here.  If MCOs, which are more recent and 
more rapidly growing than FFS plans, are able to attract the relatively healthy individuals to 
switch from their FFS plans, that would certainly account for some of the difference in the 
overall level of service provision.  Those with pre-existing health problems may be more 
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likely to stay with their current care providers, while the younger, more healthy segment of 
the population is more willing to go with the less expensive MCO.  If the MCOs are 
particularly cautious about attracting low-income patients, with their generally poorer 
health, they may either directly or indirectly tend to take individuals whose health status is 
actually better than reported, although frankly, it is not clear what such a mechanism might 
be. 
It is also possible that there is simply a more substantial problem of discrimination against 
the poor in MCOs than in FFS because of the different financial incentives in the two types 
of plans.  If caregivers are uncomfortable providing treatment for low-income patients, in 
the managed care system there is no financial incentive to nevertheless press ahead with the 
provision of care.  Traditional caregivers may be just as loath to treat their low-income 
patients, but since they will receive more compensation if they provide more care, they go 
ahead with the treatment anyway. 
An alternative explanation would be that those with higher incomes are more successful in 
working the system to obtain the higher level of care they want, whereas the poor have less 
of a practical understanding in maneuvering through the system.  The higher income 
patients may be better informed about treatment options and possibilities and thus are more 
likely to insist on medical care that the managed care providers would prefer not to provide 
on cost and efficacy grounds.  The quintile distributions in Table 1 show much of the pro-
rich inequity concentrated in the top income quintile, which supports the idea of an elite 
group accustomed to getting what they want, applying their acquisitive skills to health care 
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as well.  With traditional care there is less incentive to hold costs down, so the ability to 
aggressively pursue additional treatment is less important, since the care providers already 
have a financial incentive to provide full and even excessive care to all of their patients. 
At a quite subjective level, these last two explanations seem to be the most likely, although 
certainly further research is needed to clarify the issue.  The magnitude of the differential 
pro-rich bias of managed care compared to traditional care indicates that whatever the 
explanation is, it reflects a substantial difference between the two systems of care 
provision.  It may well be that the differences between the two systems lead MCOs to 
discriminate against their low income patients, while providing more generous care only to 
their well-informed and demanding patients in the upper income quintile.  The financial 
incentive in the traditional care system is to err on the side of overprovision of care, 
inducing patients to consume more care than they otherwise might.  To the extent that 
demand inducement exists, it may be easier to accomplish with lower income patients, who 
may not take as active a part in their treatment decisions.  Upper income patients, who 
know what they want, will certainly press to have their needs met, but since the incentive 
under fee for service is to meet everyone’s needs, the higher degree of sophistication of the 
upper income patients may actually have the effect at times of moderating induced demand 
for unnecessary services.  Unfortunately there is not much evidence to support these 
conjectures, so while we can conclude that there is strong evidence for the existence of a 
large relatively pro-rich bias in the provision of medical care by managed care providers 
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Resource Use Physician Visits Hospital Nights Total Expenditures 
Subpopulation MCO FFS MCO FFS MCO FFS 
Income Quintile       
Lowest 20% 3.59 4.66 0.62 1.45 2142 3197 
20-40% 3.55 4.06 0.37 0.83 1699 2686 
40-60% 3.65 3.84 0.44 0.62 1684 2153 
60-80% 3.88 3.86 0.21 0.59 1605 2364 
Highest 20% 4.20 4.02 0.38 0.38 2272 2219 
       
Mean 3.82 4.10 0.38 0.80 1880 2540 
Q1/Q5 0.85 1.16 1.63 3.82 0.94 1.44 




Standardized for Health Status, Age, and Gender 
 
 
Resource Use Physician Visits Hospital Nights Total Expenditures 
Subpopulation MCO FFS MCO FFS MCO FFS 
Income Quintile       
Lowest 20% 2.91 3.93 0.41 1.10 1640 2483 
20-40% 3.34 3.82 0.30 0.70 1563 2441 
40-60% 3.78 4.11 0.46 0.75 1771 2431 
60-80% 4.07 4.35 0.25 0.78 1718 2704 
Highest 20% 4.43 4.50 0.48 1.00 2455 2655 
       
Mean 3.82 4.10 0.38 0.80 1880 2540 
Q1/Q5 0.66 0.87 0.85 1.10 0.67 0.94 




Table 2: HIwv Indices 
 
Physician Visits 













Index HIWV t HIWV t HIWV t HIWV t 
Subpopulation         
MCO 0.080 6.28 0.066 5.08     
FFS 0.026 2.00 0.018 1.38     
MCO (under 65) 0.090 6.59   0.044 2.34   
MCO (65 & 
older) 0.008 0.28 
  -0.012 -0.43   
FFS (under 65) 0.031 1.79   0.003 0.10   
FFS (65 & older) -0.026 -0.54   0.005 0.25   
All USAa 0.068 7.21 0.036 3.76   0.055 5.49
Canadab       0.011 1.87




Germanyb       0.010 1.32
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Hospital Nights 
 Estimation Adjusted for: 
  
Need 
Need, Private Insurance, 
and Region 
Need, Private Insurance, 
Region and Education 
Index HIWV t HIWV t HIWV t 
Subpopulation       
MCO -0.015 -0.22 0.032 0.46   
FFS -0.111 -2.08 -0.099 -1.89   
MCO (under 65) 0.027 0.33   0.095 1.13 
MCO (65 & older) -0.152 -1.38   -0.132 -1.26 
FFS (under 65) -0.215 -2.26   -0.172 -1.85 





All USAa -0.081 -1.82     
Total Expenditures 
 Estimation Adjusted for: 
  
Need 
Need, Private Insurance, 
and Region 
Need, Private Insurance, 
Region and Education 
Index HIWV t HIWV t HIWV t 
Subpopulation       
MCO 0.072 1.33 0.055 1.00   
FFS 0.020 0.76 -0.001 -0.05   
MCO (under 65) 0.099 1.78   0.077 1.39 
MCO (65 & older) -0.047 -0.71   -0.052 -0.80 
FFS (under 65) 0.013 0.31   -0.022 -0.53 
FFS (65 & older) 0.033 1.04  
 
 0.024 0.76 
All USAa 0.064 2.38     
 




Sample Means by Income Quintile 
 















Any Private MCO 0.48 0.87 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.892 
Insurance FFS 0.43 0.77 0.90 0.93 0.95 0.788 
        
Any Public MCO 0.66 0.26 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.196 
Insurance FFS 0.67 0.40 0.24 0.20 0.19 0.347 
        
Uninsured for all  0.21 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.122 
of 1996        
        
Age MCO 27 30 30 33 37 32 
 FFS 37 40 37 39 42 39 
        
Children under 16 MCO 0.42 0.34 0.31 0.24 0.17 0.276 
 FFS 0.33 0.27 0.24 0.20 0.14 0.239 
        
Adults 16 to 64 MCO 0.48 0.56 0.63 0.72 0.79 0.661 
 FFS 0.42 0.45 0.57 0.64 0.71 0.551 
        
Adults 65 & older MCO 0.11 0.10 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.063 
 FFS 0.25 0.28 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.210 
        
Hispanic MCO 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.097 
 FFS 0.19 0.10 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.088 
        
Black MCO 0.26 0.16 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.128 
Non-Hispanic FFS 0.23 0.13 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.112 
        
Female  MCO 0.55 0.55 0.50 0.51 0.49 0.520 
 FFS 0.59 0.54 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.520 
        
Health Excellent MCO 0.30 0.36 0.40 0.40 0.42 0.390 
 FFS 0.24 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.44 0.340 
        
Health Good MCO 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.210 
 FFS 0.25 0.23 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.210 
        
Health Fair MCO 0.11 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.060 
 FFS 0.17 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.090 
        
Health Poor MCO 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.020 
 FFS 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.040 
37 
Sample Means by Income Quintile (continued) 
 















Chronic Limitation MCO 0.20 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.150 
 FFS 0.32 0.25 0.20 0.21 0.16 0.230 
       
Income per MCO 5951 13284 19575 27651 46965 25517 
Equivalent Adult FFS 6041 12948 19604 27681 48268 22275 
        
Any Doctor MCO 0.72 0.73 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.744 
Visits FFS 0.73 0.72 0.74 0.74 0.74 0.713 
        
Any Hospital  MCO 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.029 
Nights FFS 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.086 
        
Any Health MCO 0.86 0.88 0.87 0.92 0.94 0.899 
Expenditures FFS 0.84 0.86 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.874 
        
Out of pocket MCO 236 235 260 318 395 301 
expenditures FFS 311 466 402 501 533 439 
        
Northeast Region MCO 0.19 0.16 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.210 
 FFS 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.190 
        
Midwest Region MCO 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.210 
 FFS 0.20 0.26 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.260 
        
South Region MCO 0.31 0.33 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.300 
 FFS 0.40 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.35 0.360 
        
West Region MCO 0.31 0.26 0.29 0.22 0.29 0.270 
 FFS 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.170 
 
 
 
